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Abstract
With the advent of mobile computing, location-based
services have recently gained popularity. Many appli-
cations use the location provenance of users, i.e., the
chronological history of the users’ location for purposes
ranging from access control, authentication, information
sharing, and evaluation of policies. However, location
provenance is subject to tampering and collusion attacks
by malicious users. In this paper, we examine the secure
location provenance problem. We introduce a witness-
endorsed scheme for generating collusion-resistant loca-
tion proofs. We also describe two efficient and privacy-
preserving schemes for protecting the integrity of the
chronological order of location proofs. These schemes,
based on hash chains and Bloom filters respectively, al-
low users to prove the order of any arbitrary subsequence
of their location history to auditors. Finally, we present
experimental results from our proof-of-concept imple-
mentation on the Android platform and show that our
schemes are practical in today’s mobile devices.
1 Introduction
As mobile computing becomes popular, users are no
longer physically confined to a fixed location. Location-
based services have become very popular in recent
years. In many scenarios, access control, authentica-
tion, and other important decisions can be made based
on a user’s current and past physical locations. The loca-
tion history of a user is important in diverse applications
such as supply-chain management, voter registration, of-
fender tracking, customer-loyalty programs, reimburse-
ment processing, perimeter security, and intrusion detec-
tion [24]. However, when location history is used for
any high-stakes application, we must ensure the trust-
worthiness of the location history. Real-life examples
from the popular location-aware social game FourSquare
show that, even when the incentive is to get free coffee or
small discounts, people can often cheat by misreporting
or manipulating their location history [29].
The location provenance of a user is the history of the
user’s locations over time. To verify a user’s claims about
her location history, an auditor needs to verify her claims
about individual locations and visit times, as well as the
order of the her visits. Self-reported location informa-
tion such as Global Positioning System (GPS) traces or
cell phone triangulation can be manipulated by malicious
users to support false location claims. Continuous track-
ing and reporting of user’s locations violate privacy, and
is not scalable in distributed environments. A more fea-
sible and scalable approach is to require the user to ob-
tain proofs of presence from the locations she visits. To
issue a proof, locations first ensure the user’s presence
in the area using secure localization techniques such as
distance-bounding [5, 23]. Then, a proof can be issued
to the user which can later be used to prove the user’s
presence and visit time to a third party auditor.
Researchers have recently proposed schemes for gen-
erating location proofs that a user can present to an au-
ditor in order to prove the user’s presence at a particular
location at a specific point in time [14, 24, 31]. But these
schemes are susceptible to collusion attacks where the
user and the location collude to create fake proofs. Ex-
isting location proof schemes also fail to provide proofs
of the user’s chronological location history, since each
location proof only attests visits to a single location. Ver-
ifying the order of a user’s past locations is also compli-
cated as different locations may not have a synchronized
global clock, rendering local timestamps useless for find-
ing the order of the location visits. Using a centralized
timestamping service is not scalable, and also becomes
a single point of failure. To make location provenance
trustworthy, we must ensure the integrity of the chrono-
logical order of the location proofs and prevent collusion
attacks that create false history. At the same time, we
need to balance the tradeoff between the need to ver-
ify location history versus user privacy. A user should
be able to prove any subsequence of her location prove-
nance without revealing her entire location history.
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To illustrate the problem, we consider the following
scenario:
Mallory owns a moving company that bills customers
based on the distance traveled. In practice, most mov-
ing companies use a shared truck to move items. At any
given time, the truck contains items belonging to sev-
eral customers, who are billed separately. Alice and Bob
both hire the moving company. After delivering the items,
Mallory bills her customers based on a route she claims
to have used. However, Alice and Bob want to verify the
route claimed by Mallory before they would pay the bill.
Mallory can present subsequences of her location prove-
nance to Alice and Bob or their auditors for verification
of the truck’s presence in locations along the claimed
routes. To protect the privacy of her customers, Mal-
lory should reveal to each customer only the information
pertaining to that customer’s route. Alice and Bob also
want to ensure that Mallory cannot create a false proof
of visiting a location owned by her friend Colin.
In this paper, we examine the problem of verifying a
user’s location history and provenance in untrusted dis-
tributed environments. To address the shortcomings of
existing location proof schemes, we introduce the notion
of third party witnesses. To detect collusion between
users and locations to create false location proofs, we
require location proofs to be endorsed by third party
witnesses. We also examine the problem of verifying
the chronological order of location proofs. In particular,
we focus on designing schemes that allow users to prove
the chronological order of any arbitrary subsequence of
their locations, without revealing their entire location
history. Since location proofs are gathered by power and
computationally constrained mobile devices, we also
aim at designing efficient schemes.
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as
follows:
1. We introduce a witness-endorsed collusion-resistant
scheme for generation of location proofs.
2. We present a scheme for designing private location
proofs that allows users to reveal their location his-
tory only at the desired granularity.
3. We design two privacy-preserving schemes – one
using hash chains, the other using Bloom filters –
for protecting the integrity of the chronological or-
der of location proofs. Our schemes allow users to
prove any arbitrary subsequences of their location
provenance.
4. We evaluate the performance of our system on
Android-based mobile phones. Our experiments
show that our schemes for the creation and verifica-
tion of location proofs and provenance are practical
in today’s mobile phones.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 discusses applications of secure loca-
tion provenance and the challenges in protecting location
history. In Section 3, we present our witness-endorsed
location proof and provenance model, and discuss the
system and threat models. Next, in Section 4, we pro-
vide details of the location provenance generation proto-
col and discuss our schemes for generating private loca-
tion proofs and provenance. A security analysis of our
scheme against different types of attacks is presented in
Section 5. We present a proof-of-concept practical im-
plementation of the our schemes and experimental re-
sults in Section 6. Finally, we discuss related work in
Section 7, and conclude in Section 8.
2 Applications and Challenges
Provenance of an object provides the past history of the
object, i.e., its origin, modifications, movements, and
other events that happened throughout its lifetime [27].
For example, provenance of a painting provides informa-
tion about the painter, owners of the painting, informa-
tion on exhibitions, etc. In computing, provenance has
mostly been used for recording the history of data items
[7, 27]. In this paper, we propose using provenance in
another important application area – the location history
of mobile devices and users. In this section, we discuss
potential real-life applications of secure location prove-
nance. We also analyze different challenges that make
location provenance difficult to protect against malicious
adversaries.
2.1 Applications
Researchers have discussed many important applications
of systems that uses location proofs. For example, Sariou
et al. [24] described six example applications: customer
loyalty (i.e., verifying whether customers actually visited
the store many times), environment-friendly incentives
for transport (i.e., verifying that users followed an envi-
ronment friendly route), fine-grained location-restricted
content delivery, assisting in police investigation (i.e.,
verifying a suspect’s alibi), voter registration (verifying
that the voters actually live in the claimed constituency),
and reducing auction frauds. We argue that in addition to
location proofs for individual locations, the chronologi-
cal order of these proofs is also important to verify the
user’s path. Location provenance of a user is important
in situations when we make decisions based on the phys-
ical movement of the device. For example, if we know
that a computing device was exposed to an untrustwor-
thy operating environment, then we can deem the device
to be insecure. Another real life example comes from se-
cure verification of the supply chains of different objects.
For example, consumers are often not willing to purchase
meat or other food coming from an unknown place or an
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origin with questionable health standards.
The ability to check the location provenance, i.e. both
the user’s presence in individual locations and the path of
the user, opens up new mobile application areas. As an
example, location provenance can allow verification of
employee reimbursement claims (based on the employ-
ees travel and location history). Location provenance
can be used to implement new security policies, where
only users with certain location histories can access a re-
source. Another example is airline security: a passen-
ger must go through a specific route (terminal, security
checkpoints, gate) before she can enter a plane.
2.2 Challenges
Many issues complicate secure determination of a
device’s location over time. Here, we present some of
the important issues and their impact on secure location
verification.
Trustworthiness of location information. If all users
were trustworthy, then self-reported location claims
would also be trustworthy. However, without attestation
from other entities, we cannot use self-reported location
claims from users as they may not be trustworthy. Loca-
tion information reported by a location authority, i.e., an
observer associated with a location, can also be untrust-
worthy if such locations are malicious or are compro-
mised. So, we cannot depend on a single party’s claims
when building location proofs.
Proof storage. Where should the location proofs be
stored? The proofs can be stored in a trusted central
server. But in a large system, such a server will be a
bottleneck. The proofs can also be stored locally at each
of the locations, but it makes audits inefficient since the
auditor would need access to these proofs and therefore
contact each location in order to verify the user’s claim.
To make audits more efficient, it is better to store the
proofs at the user’s mobile device, which can build up
a repository of proofs for locations the user visits over
time. However, storing the proofs on the device also in-
troduces security problems – the user has full access to
its storage and therefore can tamper with the proofs. So,
any solution to this problem requires mechanisms that
make such unauthorized modifications easy to detect.
Collusion. Many of the existing schemes for verification
of location proofs assume that the locations that provide
the location proof are trustworthy [19, 24, 31]. However,
we argue that this assumption is flawed as in distributed
environments, it is not realistic to consider location au-
thorities from different security and administrative do-
mains to be trustworthy. Users can collude with the lo-
cation authorities to create false proofs of location. Such
collusion can be motivated by monetary incentives. Such
collusion can be real-time or post-facto. Users can also
collude with location authorities to implicate an honest
user.
Clock synchronization and timestamping. To accu-
rately determine the sequence of locations visited by a
user, the auditor needs to check the order of location
proofs. However, in a distributed environment, clocks
of different verifiers/observers can be different. So, the
timestamp provided by the proof issuer cannot be used
to determine order. The timestamp from the clock of the
user’s mobile device is also not trustworthy, since it can
be manipulated by the device owner to present a false
timeline. A secure third party timestamping service can
be used to timestamp a location proof once it is gener-
ated, but that scheme fails when the user and the location
colludes.
Location granularity. The granularity of location in-
formation can be a challenge when building a location
proof. The position of a user can be described using dif-
ferent granularities. The user may want to reveal infor-
mation only in the appropriate granularity to different ap-
plications. For example, the user may be willing to reveal
only coarse-grained location information to an untrusted
or semi-trusted auditor. An auditor should not learn in-
formation in a finer granularity that what the user reveals.
Privacy. Location privacy is an important issue when it
comes to tracking the location provenance. We need to
ensure the privacy of location information. While a user
wants to reveal her location to the auditor, she should not
be required to reveal all of her locations unless she wants
to do so. An auditor should only be able to access lo-
cation information that the user has authorized the audi-
tor to do. To allow this, any scheme to provide location
provenance should allow revealing any subset of loca-
tion history to the auditor. At the same time, the auditor
needs to be able to verify the order of the user’s location
when given any arbitrary subsequence of the user’s loca-
tion provenance. The next privacy issue arises from the
privacy of users visiting a location. While the user might
need endorsement from other users in finding its loca-
tion, such witnesses should not be forced to reveal their
identities. Witnesses should be able to anonymously en-
dorse location information of other users. Finally, when
a user asks for location information or an endorsement
from a location, the location should not learn anything
about the previous location of the user.
Identity and user presence. The identity of a user
should be unforgeable and unique. Otherwise, users can
create false identities and masquerade as their own wit-
nesses. A user’s identity can be bound to her public key
or a digital certificate stored in her device. A user identity
should also be resilient, hard to remove from her mobile
devices, and should not be easy to spoof or clone. A re-
lated issue is to ensure user’s presence with the mobile
device. To use a location proof based on the position of
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the user’s mobile device, we must ensure that the user is
actually carrying the device. To provide a stronger bind-
ing between the user and the device, researchers have
proposed different techniques such as biometrics [24].
For the rest of this paper, we will assume that the location
of the user’s mobile device indicates the users location.
Deployment. Deployment of location proof systems
must be incremental in nature. In the beginning, a lo-
cation authority can cover a large area, say, a city, and
provide coarse grained location proofs for the devices in
the city. As more entities are willing to provide loca-
tion proofs, more location proof authorities can be added,
with finer grained location proofs.
3 A Model for Secure Location Provenance
In this section, we present a model for secure location
provenance. We define secure location provenance as
ensuring the integrity and privacy of the location his-
tory of a user. Many existing location proof schemes are
subject to collusion attacks. In this section, we present
a collusion-resistant, privacy-aware location provenance
scheme.
3.1 Overview
From time immemorial, witnesses have been used to
attest to or endorse contracts between two parties that
are untrustworthy or mutually suspicious. A witness is
someone who is present when two other parties exchange
information or agree on some common statement. We
utilize the same idea to make location proofs robust
and collusion resistant. Informally, a witness is another
user or entity that is spatio-temporally co-located with
the user at the same location. By requiring a witness
to endorse location proofs, we reduce the threat of
collusion between the user and the location to create
false proofs. Below, we present the terminology used in
the model:
User. A User is a mobile entity that moves from loca-
tion to location. The user carries a mobile device with
her which is used to detect her location and to store the
location proofs.
Location. A Location is a physical region with a finite
area. A location is under the coverage of one or more
location authorities.
Location authority. A Location authority is a stationery
entity that is responsible for providing location proofs for
a particular location.
Location proof. A Location proof is a proof which
allows an auditor to verify that a user was physically
present at a given location at a specific time.
Endorsement. An Endorsement of a location proof is
a verifiable statement from a third-party supporting the
location proof.
Location provenance entry. A Location provenance
entry is a claim about a user’s location at a certain time,
supported by one or more location proofs and endorse-
ments. It also includes ordering information which is
used to determine the chronological order of location
proofs.
Location provenance chain. A Location provenance
chain is a chronologically ordered sequence of location
provenance entries.
Witnesses. A Witness is an entity who can endorse a
location proof, attesting the presence of a user in a par-
ticular location belonging to an observer. Witnesses can
themselves be mobile users. They can detect the pres-
ence of users within their reach.
Auditor. An Auditor is a semi-trusted entity that can ver-
ify the location history of a user. Given a subsequence of
a user’s location provenance chain, the auditor is able to
verify whether the chain is valid or it has been tampered
with, or it contains false statements.
3.2 System Model
We assume that users carry mobile devices capable of
communicating with other devices and locations over
Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. The devices have local storage for
storing the location proofs. We assume that the device
owner or user has full access to the storage and com-
putation of the device, can run any application on the
device, and can delete, modify, or insert any content in
data stored in the device. The mobile devices are power-
limited. When a device visits a location, it can find the lo-
cation authority (or authorities) for the location. We also
assume that the device can access the public key for the
location authorities. The location authorities for a given
location can check the presence of devices in that area.
Devices can also check the presence of other devices, or
the devices advertise their presence to neighboring de-
vices. Communication between a device and the location
authority or another device happens over wireless chan-
nels. At a later time, the user presents a location history
claim to the auditor, providing her with a subsequence
of her location provenance chain, containing an ordered
subset of her previous locations and the times she visited
these locations. The auditor uses the information stored
in the location provenance chain to determine whether
the claimed location history is supported by the proofs
contained in the provenance chain.
3.3 Threat Model
We consider different classes of adversaries, and also
combinations of these adversaries in a collusion attack.
In our threat model, we will first discuss the assets, and
then talk about the capability of attackers and the attacks
they can launch.
Assets. The two main targets considered in our threat
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model are: the location proofs, and the chronological or-
dering of location proofs. An adversary should not be
able to create a location proof for a location that the user
has not visited. Also, even if the user has visited the lo-
cation, an adversary should not be able to create a proof
for a different (local) time than the actual time of visit. A
false location proof is one that attests to the user’s pres-
ence in a location not visited by the user, or the presence
at a different time than the real time of visit. The order
information is also critical and must be secured. An ad-
versary should not be able to reorder the location proofs
to change the sequence of location visits in the user’s
history. An additional target of malicious attackers can
be the privacy of the user’s location history. An attacker
may want to create a dossier of users visiting a given lo-
cation. For a given user, a malicious attacker may also
want to learn the user’s location history and the identities
of other users it has encountered in the past.
Attacker capabilities and attacks. Unlike previous
work in the area [19, 24, 31], we do not consider the lo-
cation authorities as trustworthy. We assume that users,
location authorities, or other witness devices present in
the location and participating in the proof generation pro-
tocol can all be malicious. Users, locations, and wit-
nesses can collude with one another. Typical attacks such
as MAC address fingerprinting are prevented via known
techniques such as MAC address cloning [21]. A mali-
cious user does not have access to the private key of a
non-colluding user, witness, or location. We assume that
well-known techniques are used to prevent denial of ser-
vice attacks by adversaries who flood the location with
proof requests and witnesses with endorsement requests.
In addition, we assume that users do not have multiple
identities and therefore no Sybil attacks occur [10].
We aim at making location provenance chains tamper-
evident, as opposed to tamper-proof. Since the prove-
nance information is carried at the User’s mobile device,
the user can always tamper with it. Without trusted hard-
ware, it is impossible to prevent the user from tampering
with provenance. Therefore, we focus on ensuring de-
tection of different types of attacks on provenance. In
the following, we list a number of attacks we want to
prevent.
False presence. A malicious user can create a fake
location proof without being physically present in
the location.
False time (backdating, future dating, present
dating). A location proof is generated for a user
who has visited the location, but the proof’s time is
different from the time of visit. The backdating at-
tack creates a proof for a past time, while the future
dating attack, a proof is generated for a future time.
In a post-dating attack, a location proof is planned
to be issued at a future time (i.e., the location au-
thority colludes with location to create a false proof
with a future date, and premeditates to introduce the
false proof at a later time).
Reordering. The sequence of user location proofs
is reordered to create a false path for the user.
Implication. A location authority and/or witnesses
falsely claim the user is/was present in the location
False endorsement. A colluding witness endorses
a user who is not present in the same location as the
witness.
Denial of presence. A user denies having visited a
location.
Proof switching. When a legitimate proof is used
to create a false proof for a different location.
Doppleganger. When the device is cloned or its
keys are shared, to create a separate device that is
capable of participating in protocols pretending as
the device.
4 A Secure Location Provenance Scheme
Definitions. To state that user U has visited location L
at time t, the location authority prepares a location state-
ment LS as follows:
LS =< U,L, t > (1)
Depending on the secure localization scheme, the lo-
cation statement can include further proof of the user’s
presence and interaction with the location [19, 24].
The location authority creates a location proof LP as
follows:
LP =< LS, sL(LS) > (2)
where SL(LS) represents the digital signature computed
on LS using the location authority’s private key.
An endorsed location proof, ELP is defined as fol-
lows:
ELP =< LP,E > (3)
where E is an endorsement defined as.
E =< ES, Sw(ES) > (4)
where ES is an endorsement statement, and Sw(ES) is
a signature computed by the endorsing witnessw onES.
The endorsement statementES is created by a witness
w to endorse LP .
ES =< w,U,L, t, h(LP ), te > (5)
where te is the signed endorsement timestamp given by
the location and h is a cryptographic hash function.
A location provenance entry, LProv is defined as:
LProv =< ELP,C > (6)
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Figure 1: Different steps of the Location Provenance
Protocol.
where C is an additional cryptographic construct used
to provide chronological ordering of the location prove-
nance entries.
Finally, a location provenance chain LPC of size n
for user U is defined as,
LPC =< LProv1, LProv2, · · · , LProvn >, (7)
where for any 1 6 i < j 6 n, U visited Li before
visiting Lj .
4.1 Location Provenance Protocol
Creation of a new location provenance entry for a
location the user visits takes place in the following steps,
as illustrated in Figure 1:
a. Location authority discovery and proof re-
quest. When a user arrives at a location, she initiates
the protocol for getting a location proof from the loca-
tion authority associated with the location. Each location
is identified by a unique global identifier. We assume
that location authorities and their identifiers are publicly
available (perhaps via a lookup), or location authorities
periodically broadcast their information to nearby de-
vices. The user obtains the identity of the location au-
thority and sends a request for location proof (pReq)
message to the location authority. This message includes
the identity U of the user represented by her public key
[24], or by anonymized identifiers [19]. It also includes
chronological ordering information C from the last entry
of the user’s location provenance chain.
b. Secure localization. Upon receiving the pReq mes-
sage, the location authority runs a secure localization
step to determine whether the device is actually present
in the location. We do not require any specific local-
ization scheme – any secure scheme including distance-
bounding or visual scanning can be used in this step.
c. Location proof generation. After being satisfied that
the user is present in the location, the location authority
generates the location proof, consisting of the location
statement and a signature attesting the statement. The
statement includes the identities of the user and the loca-
tion, and the local timestamp of the visit. The location
authority also creates the new chronological ordering in-
formation for the new location provenance entry. Next,
the location authority sends this back to the user.
d. Witness discovery and Endorsement request. The
user next contacts a witness to endorse the location proof.
To obtain an endorsement, the user sends the message
eReq to the witness. The devices willing to serve as a
witness can advertise this to nearby devices.
e. Witness localization. The witness perform its own
distance bounding or other secure localization to verify
whether the user is co-located with it.
f. Endorsement message creation. After verifying user
presence, the witness creates an endorsement message
ES and sends a request tReq to the location authority
for timestamping.
g. Endorsement timestamping. The location authority
creates a signed timestamp ts and then returns it to the
witness. It does not approve the timestamp if the times-
tamp request came a long time after the original proof
was issued.
h. Endorsement signature generation. If the endorse-
ment timestamp te is after t, but not by a great extent,
the witness accepts the timestamp. Finally, the witness
creates the signed endorsement E and sends it to the
user. The witness can use its private key to create the
endorsement signature. If the witness wants to remain
anonymous, she can also sign the endorsement with a
group signature key [8] rather than its private key. The
user puts the endorsed location proof in the new location
provenance entry for the location.
Additionally, the location maintains a publicly visi-
ble list where hashes of each of the location proofs are
inserted. At every epoch, it publishes the current state
of this list along with a signature. The purpose of this
publicly available list of proof hashes is to prevent back-
dating and future-dating attacks (we discuss it further in
Section 5).
4.2 Private Location Proofs.
The position of a user can be described using multiple
granularities. For example, a user’s location can be de-
scribed in terms of the city, neighborhood, block, street
address, or the exact position. To different auditors, the
user may want to reveal the her in different granularities.
To allow users to prove their locations to an auditor only
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at the desired granularity, we introduce the notion of pri-
vate location proofs. For this, we use two mechanisms –
blinded location statements and proxy proofs.
Suppose the user’s location L can be described in n
different granularities, i.e., L = {l1, l2, · · · , ln}. To al-
low the user to choose any one of them and prove that
to the auditor, a naive solution is to create multiple loca-
tion statements, each with a different granularity of the
user’s location, and then create separate proofs for each
[19]. However, it increases the burden on the location
authority. Instead, we create a single proof where the lo-
cation granularities are blinded as follows: the location
authority includes the n location attributes in the loca-
tion statement LS, and also includes cryptographic com-
mitments for them [4]. That is, for each granularity li,
the location authority computes a commitment commi
as follows: commi = h(li, ri), where h is a one-way
hash function, and ri is a random nonce. The private
location statement LSp, is constructed as follows:
LSp =< U,L, t, (comm1| · · · |commn)|(r1| · · · |rn) >
where | is the concatenation operator. When computing
the signature over the LSp, the location authority does
not use the actual location granularities li, but includes
the commitments commi. This allows removal of one
or more location attributes from the location statement
when it is revealed to the auditor. The user provides
the location granularity li and the corresponding random
nonce ri. Using these, the auditor can verify the un-
blinded location entry matches the corresponding com-
mitment that was used to create the location statement.
This, however, still does not prevent a curious auditor
from guessing the user’s location based on the position
of the location authority. To prevent that, we propose us-
ing proxy proofs that are issued by a third party location
authority. Suppose that the location authority in a city
block is requested to provide a private proof with gran-
ularities ranging from the city to the exact location of
the user. The location authority for the block can con-
tact the location authority for the city for help with this.
For this to work, the two location authorities must trust
each other. Upon creating a location proof, the block’s
location authority sends it to the city location authority.
The latter verifies the proof, and then re-signs it, replac-
ing also the identity of the block location authority in the
location statement. The new location proof is sent to the
block location authority who sends it to the user. On re-
ceiving such a proof, an auditor cannot guess which city
block the user has been, unless the user reveals it to the
auditor.
4.3 Creating Location Provenance Chains
A location provenance chain consists of location prove-
nance entries and chronological meta data that shows
the order of these entries. As discussed earlier, users
should be able to reveal any arbitrary subsequence of
their past locations and prove their chronological order-
ing. For this, we propose two schemes – a signed hash
chain scheme, and a Bloom filter based scheme.
4.3.1 Hash Chain-based Ordering
In a signed hash chain scheme, each of the provenance
entries contain chronological ordering metadata linking
the entry directly with the previous entry. For exam-
ple, we can store a signed hash value at each location
provenance entry, which is computed by taking the hash
value from the previous location, concatenate it with the
hash of the current location provenance entry, and then
sign it. The one-way nature of hash functions makes
it impossible to modify the ordering information. Each
hash is signed by the corresponding location authority,
and can be verified by the auditor. To create a new lo-
cation provenance entry LProvi, the location author-
ity requests the chronological ordering metadata Ci−1
from the last location provenance entry, and then calcu-
lates the new metadata Ci using the following equation:
Ci = sL(h(LPi)|Ci−1), where sL indicates a digital sig-
nature using the location’s private key.
When presenting the chosen subsequence to the au-
ditor, the user removes the location proofs correspond-
ing to locations she wants to keep private. However, the
signed hash C values for all fields are retained, as well as
the corresponding h(LP ) hashes. Utilizing the one way
nature of hash chains, the auditor can verify the order of
the locations by recreating and validating the C values.
The downside of this scheme is that, at the worst case
when the head and tail locations in the list are revealed,
the auditor has to traverse the entire chain regardless of
how many elements from the chain have been revealed
by the user.
4.3.2 Accumulator-based Ordering
Instead of linking two provenance entries using hashes,
we introduce a novel accumulator based scheme to prove
chronological ordering. The key idea is to accumulate
the hash values of all location proofs obtained so far in
the accumulator for the current provenance entry. An
accumulator in this context is a construct that can be used
for set operations. To create a new location provenance
entry, the location authority requests the last value of the
accumulator from the user. It then hashes the current
location proof, inserts it into the accumulator, and signs
it, and sends it back to the user. Two accumulators can
be compared as follows: the accumulator for later entries
are supersets of that of previous entries.
For example, suppose the user visited locations
L1, L2, L3, L4, in that order. The accumulator C1 stored
in LProv1 has the hash of LP1. To create C2 for
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LProv2, the location authority takes C1, and inserts the
hash of LP2 in it, to obtain C2. Similarly, C4 has the
hashes of the location proofsLP1, LP2, LP3, LP4. Now,
given any two accumulators Ci, and Cj , we can prove
their order by checking which one of them is the subset
of the other. For example, C1 is a subset of C2, C3, and
C4. Also, C2 is a subset of C3 and C4, but not of C1. In
other words, given two accumulators Ci and Cj , the au-
ditor can verify that Li was visited prior to visiting Lj if
and only if Ci is a subset of Cj Thus, without having any
explicit chaining between the entries, we can check the
ordering of the the location proofs. Unlike hash chains,
accumulators have the nice property that we no longer
have to keep the entire provenance chain to show order
of any arbitrary subsequence. Rather, a user can reveal
only the elements in the subsequence and the auditor can
verify their order by checking the accumulators.
While any accumulator scheme that allows set mem-
bership checks will work here, we propose using a
Bloom-filter based accumulator. A Bloom-filter is a
probabilistic data structure with no false negatives, which
can be used to test set membership in constant time [3].
In this construction, we keep a single Bloom filter per lo-
cation provenance entry. Using a Bloom filter has certain
advantages. Since a Bloom filter is essentially a bit array,
we can verify order quickly, by checking which bit array
is a subset of the other, using fast bitwise operations (i.e.,
A is a subset of B, iff A AND B = A). Inserting a new lo-
cation proof and membership check can be done in con-
stant time. The downside of using a Bloom filter is the
false positive rate. However, we can reduce that by allot-
ting more bits to the Bloom filter. Also, given two Bloom
filters, an adversary can compute the number of bits in
which they differ, and thereby calculate number of lo-
cations visited between these two locations. Depending
on the scenario, this may or may not be a problem. We
argue that the Bloom filter based scheme, while incur-
ring more space than the hash chain based accumulator,
is preferable when revealing smaller fractions of visited
locations. This is because with Bloom filters, only the
filters from the revealed provenance entries are needed,
while in the hash chain, the entire chain is needed in the
worst case.
4.4 Audits
We assume that, the auditor has access to the public keys
of the location authorities and the group keys of different
groups. To initiate an audit, the user presents the auditor
with a location history claim and the supporting location
provenance information. The location history claim con-
sists of an ordered sequence of location claims. Each
location claim consists of the identifier for a location and
the time of visit.
The auditor’s task is two-fold: the auditor first checks
if each location claim matches the corresponding loca-
tion provenance entry. To verify this, the auditor checks
the integrity of the location provenance entry, verifies the
signatures, matches the endorsements with the location
proofs, and finally checks whether the location and time
claimed by the user matches the location and time men-
tioned in the location proof(s). To prevent back or future-
dating attacks, the auditor also checks if a location proof
is in the published list of proof hashes of the correspond-
ing epoch for that location. Next, the auditor verifies
whether the claimed order of the locations matches the
given location provenance entries. To do that, the auditor
uses the chronological ordering information given in the
location provenance entries.
5 Security Analysis
In this section, we present an analysis of the security
properties of our schemes. We start by enumerating the
different types of attackers and collusion among them.
Then we analyze how our schemes can protect against
such attacks.
Symbols. We define the following symbols: honest user:
U , malicious user: U¯ , honest location: L, malicious Lo-
cation: L¯, honest witness: W , malicious Witness: W¯ Us-
ing the above symbols, we can have the following three
single party attacks: Malicious user (U¯LW ), malicious
location (UL¯W ), and malicious witness (ULW¯ ). We
can also define three two party collusions, and one three
party collusion. Table 1 summarizes the different attack
scenarios and the corresponding threats.
Single entity attacks. The three single entity attacks
are U¯LW , U L¯W , and ULW¯. In U¯LW , a malicious
user U¯ creates false location proofs. But if L and W are
honest, this attack does not succeed, since an honest L
will not sign a location proof if it does not detect the user
in its proximity. Also, an honest W will not endorse a
location statement not accompanied by a proof from the
location. U L¯W attacks also fail since the dishonest loca-
tion authority L¯ cannot create a false proof when the user
is not present in the location. This is because the secure
localization step involves interaction between the U and
L¯, and L¯ cannot falsify the interaction without knowing
U ’s keys [31]. An honest witness will also not endorse a
proof unless it can detect U ’s presence. The only thing
L¯ can do is to provide a false timestamp. However, an
honest witness will not endorse a proof if the timestamp
differs a lot from its own location proof timestamp. Fi-
nally, a malicious witness (ULW¯) cannot do any harm
other than denial of service.
Multiple entity collusion. Two entity attacks involve
scenarios where any two of the entities in user, location,
and witness collude together. There are three possibili-
ties: U¯L¯W , U¯LW¯, and U L¯W¯.
The user and location can collude (U¯L¯W ) to create
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Model Description Threat/Attack
ULW Everyone is honest No collusion.
U¯LW Malicious user False location proofs, reordering, doppleganger, denial
or presence, proof switching.
U L¯W Malicious location authority Denial of service, implication.
ULW¯ Malicious witness False endorsement, privacy.
U¯L¯W user and Location collude False location proofs.
U¯LW¯ user and Witness collude False endorsement.
U L¯W¯ Location and Witness collude Implication.
U¯L¯W¯ Everyone collude False proofs.
Table 1: Threat model
false location proofs. First, they can create a proof of-
fline even when the user is not present at the location.
Such a proof will not be endorsed by an honest witness,
and hence can be detected by an auditor. Next, the user
may be present in the location, but the location proof can
be given a backdated or future-dated timestamp by the
location. There are several ways of detecting and pre-
venting such attacks. We can prevent backdating by re-
quiring each location to publish a list of users that has
visited the location. While a simple list would serve the
purpose, that violates user privacy. So, the list should
be hard to decode without knowing the user (i.e., given
just the list, it is difficult to figure out the identities of
the users. But given a location proof, it can be checked
whether the location proof was issued by the location at
the given epoch). Locations can divide time into epochs.
At the end of each epoch, the location publishes the list
of location proofs it issued (or rather, the hash of the lo-
cation proofs it issued.). Given just the hashes, it is diffi-
cult to figure out the location proofs due to the one-way
nature of hash functions. However, if one is presented
with a location proof, computing the hash and checking
if it is included in the list is not very difficult. The lo-
cation can actually publish a signed accumulator of all
hashes of the location proofs for a given epoch. This
can prevent backdating attacks in the following manner:
suppose that the location and the user collude to create
a backdated location proof at time tu that corresponds
to epoch e. However, the location has already published
the accumulator for that epoch, so the auditor can go and
check the accumulator for that epoch using the location
proof. Also, witnesses can check to see if the location
proof timestamp is different from its own location proof
timestamp. The same applies to future dating. If the lo-
cation gives a user a future timestamp, it must also give
all the witnesses a future timestamp to evade detection.
A malicious user and a colluding witness (U¯LW¯)
cannot create false location proofs if the location author-
ity is honest. Similarly, a malicious location authority
can collude with a dishonest witness (U L¯W¯) and at-
tempt to implicate an honest user. However, if the user
never participated in a proof protocol with the location
authority, such an attack will not work. Finally, the lo-
cation authority can give a user a backdated or a future
dated timestamp. A colluding witness can endorse such
a false timestamped proof. However, the user chooses its
own witness, and to effectively launch the attack, a lo-
cation authority will have to collude with a majority of
the users in the area. The location proof timestamp will
also not will also not match with the timestamp of the
published location proof accumulator for the epoch.
Finally, all three entities can collude (U¯L¯W¯) to gen-
erate false location proofs and endorsements. Even then,
a backdated attack can be foiled if the auditor checks the
published accumulator for the epoch corresponding to
the proof timestamp. A future-dated timestamp will also
not match with the epoch timestamp. The only attack
that is possible here is a post-dating attack, i.e., when the
user, location authority, and witness collude to create a
location proof for a future time, but does not publish it
in the epoch report. After creating the proof, the location
caches it, and later includes it in the future epochs accu-
mulator, at a time when the user is actually at a different
location. Such attacks are hard to prevent. An auditor
can require a stricter proof model involving statements
from more than one location authorities.
Other attacks. In a doppelganger attack, the user shares
her secrets with an accomplice who uses them to imper-
sonate the user and obtain a location proof from a loca-
tion where the user is not present. For example, the user
can share her keys with an accomplice, who can use them
to get proofs on behalf of the user. This can be prevented
via radiometric signatures, which are unique [6].
6 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance and feasibility of our lo-
cation provenance scheme, we created a proof of con-
cept system prototype. We implemented the location
provenance scheme in Java 1.5. We developed a loca-
tion provenance application on the Android 2.2 platform
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Figure 2: Comparison of space requirements of Bloom
Filter and Hash Chain schemes.
and deployed the application on Motorola Droid 9 mo-
bile phones. Each phone had a ARM Cortex A8 proces-
sor with 550 mHz clock speed. The application also sup-
ported the witness mode, where the mobile phone acted
as the witness for another phone. We also implemented
a location proof generation application for the location
authority. This was also on the Android 2.2 platform,
and was tested on the same Droid phones. Note that we
decided to evaluate the performance on mobile phones
so that location authorities can be deployed easily and
cheaply. For cryptographic operations, we used 1024-
bit DSA signatures and 160-bit SHA-1 hashes from the
Bouncy Castle cryptographic library [1].
6.1 Experiments
Goals. The goal of our experiments was to evaluate
the feasibility of deploying our schemes on existing off-
the-shelf mobile devices and to compare the Bloom filter
based scheme and the hash chain based scheme for secur-
ing the chronology of proofs. For each scheme, we mea-
sured the space requirements and overhead of location
provenance and private location proofs. We also mea-
sured the proof generation times and audit performance
under different configurations and location granularities.
Space requirement. Figure 2 shows the space require-
ments for the provenance chain ordering mechanism for
the Bloom Filter scheme. For the Bloom Filter, we used
a 0.1% false positive rate. The hash chain based scheme
requires 40 bytes per entry (the size of a DSA signa-
ture), regardless of the size of the provenance chain.
The Bloom filter based scheme, however, requires more
space, depending on the total size of the chain. For ex-
ample, for a chain with 1000 locations, we need 40 bytes
per location provenance entry in the hash chain scheme,
but to have a 0.1% false positive rate, we need 1797 bytes
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Figure 3: Time to generate location proofs. For the
Bloom filter scheme, generation rate is 46 proof/second,
while with hash chains, the rate is 60 proofs/second.
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Figure 4: Worst case audit time for a 10,000-entry loca-
tion provenance chain, when different percentages (1%,
10%, 50%, and 100%) of the locations are revealed.
for the Bloom filter stored with each entry.
Proof generation time. Figure 3 shows the time to
generate location proofs by the location authority. The
hash-chain based scheme is slightly faster, and we ob-
tained proof generation rate of 60 proofs/second on the
Droid phones. With the Bloom filter based scheme, the
proof generation rate is 46 proofs/second. Since we
achieved this rate even on low-end phones, it shows that
our scheme is feasible. In practice, larger locations will
have powerful and dedicated computers that can generate
proofs even faster.
Overhead of private location proofs. For private lo-
cation proofs, additional space required for each granu-
larity in the location statement includes a SHA-1 hash
for the commitment (20 bytes), and a random nonce (4
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Figure 5: Comparison of worst-case audit times for the Bloom-filter and Hash-chain schemes, when 1%, 10%, 50%,
and 100% of location entries are revealed to the auditor. When smaller fraction of locations are revealed, the Bloom
filter scheme outperforms the hash chain scheme.
bytes), resulting in a total of 24 bytes additional space
per granularity. It also slightly increased proof genera-
tion time by approximately 0.4 milliseconds per granu-
larity (approx. 1.8% overhead for Bloom filter and 2.4%
overhead for the hash chain scheme).
Audit performance. We next measured the worst case
audit performance of the hash chain and Bloom filter
based provenance schemes. We created an Audit appli-
cation to verify the integrity and consistency of the loca-
tion proofs as well as location provenance. The applica-
tion was tested on the Droid phones. For both schemes,
we measured the audit performance for different sized
chains, with different number of items revealed to the
auditor. Figure 4 shows the relative performance of the
two schemes for a 10,000 location chain, when 1%, 10%,
50%, and 100% of the locations contained in the prove-
nance chain are revealed to the auditor. We see that when
all the locations are revealed, both schemes perform on
an equal basis, requiring about 15 milliseconds per lo-
cation proof. However, when a small number of loca-
tion proofs are revealed to the auditor, the Bloom filter
based scheme outperforms the hash chain scheme. For
example, when 1% locations are revealed, the Bloom fil-
ter based scheme still requires 15 milliseconds per proof,
but the hash chain based scheme requires 564 millisec-
onds. This is because, with the Bloom filters, the auditor
only needs to check the revealed location proofs to verify
the order. But with the hash chain scheme, the auditor,
at the worst case (when locations near the beginning and
end are revealed), needs to traverse the entire hash chain
to verify the ordering. We further illustrate this in Fig-
ure. 5(a)–5(d), where we show the comparison of audit
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times when 1%, 10%, 50%, and 100% locations are re-
vealed, respectively. In all but the last case, the Bloom
filter based scheme outperforms the hash chain scheme.
7 Related Work
Secure location verification and location privacy have
been explored by many researchers. Gonzalez-Tablas et
al. provide an overview of research on secure location
verification [11]. Research on secure location verifica-
tion can broadly be divided into two categories: verifying
current location (secure localization), and verifying past
location (location proofs). In the first category, the goal
is to securely determine the current location of the user,
while in the second category, the focus is on verifying
the past locations of a user using location proofs.
7.1 Secure Localization
Gabber et al. described early work on proving location
of devices [13]. The focus of this work was to ver-
ify the location of customer equipment (such as satel-
lite receivers). The three schemes described here used
telephone caller ID, GPS, and cellular tower signals re-
spectively. Unfortunately, all of these methods can be
bypassed by malicious attackers [19, 24]. Denning et
al. presented a location verification scheme using loca-
tion signature sensors (LSS). This requires specialized
hardware that can obtain signal from a large number of
GPS satellites and combine them to create a signature.
Verifiers also concurrently obtain a signature from the
satellites, and use that to determine the device’s location
[9]. However, this scheme does not provide any strong
binding between user identities and the LSS signature,
which in turn can allow spoofing and impersonation at-
tacks [19].
Brands et al. introduced distance bounding proto-
cols for determining proximity of a device to a loca-
tion [5]. This scheme uses the round-trip delay of the
challenge response protocol between the user and the
location authority. Using distance bounding, a location
authority can check the minimum distance between it
and the user. However, this scheme is prone to spoof-
ing since it does not bind the user’s identity to the proof
[5]. Sastry et al. introduced a secure location verification
scheme that used a combination of radio frequency sig-
nal and ultrasound to determine the location of the user
[26]. However, this is subject to wormhole attacks [19].
Researchers have since then extensively studied distance
bounding as a practical and efficient scheme for secure
localization [23]. Vora et al. discussed location verifi-
cation using radio broadcast in wireless sensor networks
[30]. Distance bounding and other secure localization
techniques can be effectively used in the secure localiza-
tion phase of our scheme.
7.2 Location Proof
The notion of secure unforgeable location proofs was
discussed by Waters et al. [31], who discuss a secure
scheme which a device can use to get a location proof
from a location manager. However, it requires users to
know the auditors a prior. Lenders et al. presented a
secure geotagging service for verifying the location and
timestamp for user-generated content [17]. Users wish-
ing to timestamp their content send a hash to a location-
timestamp authority, which then determines the user’s
location and then issues a location-time signature using
the hash. Here, the focus is on certifying the user sup-
plied content rather than the user’s location. The signa-
ture does not bind the content to the user’s identity. Their
system is also highly centralized.
Saroiu et al. [24] proposed a mechanism for creating
secure location proofs. In this system, users and wire-
less access points exchange their signed public keys to
create a timestamped proof of visit. Saroiu et al. [25]
and Gilbert et al. [14] described trustworthy sensors
where the reading from a sensor is attested using hard-
ware based TPM or software based virtual machines.
Luo et al. described a scheme for creating privacy-
preserving location proofs [19]. Instead of using pub-
lic keys as identity, the user commits to a random nonce
when initiating the location proof protocol with the proof
provider. They support multiple location granularities,
but the location information for different granularities
are separately encrypted and decryption keys have to
be transmitted to the user. They also described six de-
sign goals for flexible location proof systems : scalabil-
ity, application-agnostic proofs, proactive collection of
proofs, user anonymity and privacy, and the ability to
run on regular hardware. Our scheme for location prove-
nance meet all these goals. However, our work differs
from most of the existing schemes for two main rea-
sons: first, most of the existing research do not con-
sider that the location authority to be malicious. The
schemes also do not protect against collusion attacks. In
contrast, our witness-endorsement location provenance
scheme is resistant against collusion between locations.
Second, many existing schemes do not provide mech-
anisms for verifying the order of location proofs. For
schemes which do provide ordering (such as Path-stamps
[12]), there is no support for revealing only a subset of
locations to auditors, which we do provide using our lo-
cation provenance scheme.
7.3 Location History
Ananthanarayanan et al. discussed a framework for col-
lecting and storing sequence of user locations [2]. In
their StarTrack system, sequence of a user’s location and
time entries are stored in tracks which can later be shared
compared, clustered, and queried. While tracks are simi-
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lar to location provenance chains, security issues are not
considered, making tracks vulnerable to attacks by ma-
licious users. Zugenmaier et al. introduced the notion
of location stamps [32] for cell phones. The stamps pro-
vide proof about the location of the user at a certain time.
Based on this idea, Gonzalez-Tablas et al. developed the
notion of Path-stamps [12], where the location history
of the user is considered. Here, a sequence of location
stamps, i.e., location proofs, are combined by creating
a hash chain. A big difference with our work is that
they considered the proof issuer to be trustworthy and
not collude with the users. Their system is dependent on
a centralized proof issuer, which makes it non-scalable
and inefficient. The path stamps protocol also requires
each user to possess a specialized hardware that is used
to authenticate the user. This requirement makes the sys-
tem difficult and expensive to deploy. Path stamps proto-
col does not support publication of partial path, therefore
users must reveal their entire path to auditors even when
they are proving a subset of their path. In contrast, our
schemes allows users to have privacy by enabling them
to prove any arbitrary subset of their location history. Fi-
nally, Interaction-based missed connection services have
been described by Manweiler et al. [20]. Here, two mu-
tual strangers can use the SMILE protocol to establish
shared knowledge, which can later be used to prove that
they have met before. Such a scheme can be used to
make our endorsement schemes truly anonymous.
7.4 Secure Provenance in Other Domains
Provenance has been studied by researchers to provide
information about the lineage, origin, and transformation
of data objects. Simmhan et al. provided a survey of
the use of data provenance in scientific computing [27].
Most of the systems discussed there were scientific com-
puting systems, where security issues are not handled.
Muniswamy-Reddy described a provenance aware file
system named PASS [22]. It allowed automated record-
ing of data provenance for files. Hasan et al. discussed
secure provenance for files [15], and developed an effi-
cient system for recording file system provenance in a se-
cure manner [16]. Different aspects of secure data prove-
nance have been discussed by other researchers [18, 28].
While conceptually similar to secure data provenance,
secure location provenance introduces new challenges
and attack vectors, that are not a concern in data prove-
nance. For example, in secure location provenance, we
need to ensure the user’s physical presence in the loca-
tion. This is not a concern in data provenance. However,
with modifications, the location provenance scheme de-
scribed in this paper can be effectively applied to tracking
data movement in cloud computing.
8 Conclusion
Secure location provenance allows verification of lo-
cation history, enabling trustworthy location-aware ser-
vices. The ability to verify location history claims can
lead to new applications in many domains. In this pa-
per, we analyzed the secure location provenance problem
and introduced techniques for making location proofs re-
sistant against collusion. Our location proof scheme al-
lows a user to prove her location in different granularities
to different auditors. To protect against forgery of lo-
cation chronology, we presented two schemes based on
hash chains and Bloom filters. Through experimental re-
sults from our proof of concept implementation on the
Android-based Droid phones, we demonstrated that such
schemes are practical on today’s mobile devices. Our
future work includes the developing a theoretical frame-
work for the different degrees of trust for location proofs.
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